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Available online 8 November 2013The neural efficiency hypothesis describes the phenomenon that brighter individuals show
lower brain activation than less bright individuals when working on the same cognitive tasks.
The present study investigated whether the brain activation–intelligence relationship still
applies when more versus less intelligent individuals perform tasks with a comparable person-
specific task difficulty. In an fMRI-study, 58 persons with lower (n = 28) or respectively
higher (n = 30) intelligence worked on simple and difficult inductive reasoning tasks having
the same person-specific task difficulty. Consequently, less bright individuals received sample-
based easy and medium tasks, whereas bright subjects received sample-based medium and
difficult tasks. This design also allowed a comparison of lower versus higher intelligent
individuals when working on the same tasks (i.e. sample-based medium task difficulty). In line
with expectations, differences in task performance and in brain activation were only found for
the subset of tasks with the same sample-based task difficulty, but not when comparing tasks
with the same person-specific task difficulty. These results suggest that neural efficiency
reflects an (ability-dependent) adaption of brain activation to the respective task demands.
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The study of human intelligence is an old research tradition,
starting over a century ago. Spearman (1904) proposed that a
general ability factor (g) determines performance in a variety
of cognitive activities, includingperception, attention,memory,
language and thought. The best indicator of general ability in
Spearman's sense is fluid intelligence (Carroll, 1993; Cattell,
1971). Fluid intelligence (gf) tests measure the ability to solve
novel problems that depend relatively little on stored
knowledge or the ability to learn. In order to correctly answer
fluid intelligence tasks it is necessary to actively maintain
domain-specific information and domain-general attention or
“executive” control of ongoing processes. Consequently, it can
be assumed that gf is related to attentional control andworking
memory (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff,
2002; Kane & Engle, 2003). Among different tests the Raven's
Progressive Matrices are often considered the best availableicense. 
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the numerical inductive reasoning task to be a good indicator of
fluid intelligence.
The focus of the current study is on the neurobiological
underpinnings of fluid intelligence. Numerous structural and
functional brain imaging studies have been conducted so far
to investigate neurobiological correlates of intelligence. A
review of mostly structural findings led to the formulation of
the parieto-frontal integration theory of intelligence (P-FIT;
Jung & Haier, 2007). In the attempt to locate intelligence in the
human brain Jung andHaier (2007) reviewed37 neuroimaging
studies of intelligence. They found that mostly frontal and
parietal areas of the cortex are related to intelligence. After a
first sensory analysis of incoming information in the occipital
cortex the sensory information will be abstracted and
elaborated in parietal areas. Testing hypotheses concerning a
problem and finding the best solution are conducted in the
frontal cortex, which interacts with the parietal cortex. The
anterior cingulate cortex accounts for the response selection
and inhibits competing ones. Moreover, the efficiency of these
cognitive processes may depend on the integrity of white
matter connections between the regions (Jung & Haier, 2007).
Barbey, Colom, Paul, and Grafman (2013) demonstrated that
damagewithinwhitematter fiber tracts (superior longitudinal/
arcuate fasciculus connecting frontal and parietal cortices)
impairs fluid intelligence. To sum up, the fronto-parietal
integration theory provides an important framework for the
study of human intelligence, since its formulation has been
supported by numerous studies (e.g., Colom et al., 2009; for a
review see, Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 2010).
Besides the P-FIT (Jung & Haier, 2007), which is based
mostly on evidence of structural correlates of intelligence,
the neural efficiency hypothesis provides another influential
account to explain the relationship of intelligence and brain
activation. The neural efficiency hypothesis has first been
stated by Haier et al. (1988) who observed that participants'
intelligence scores and regional metabolic rates are negatively
correlated between− .48 and− .84 (for different brain areas),
indicating that participants with higher cognitive ability
display a lower energy consumption of the brain. Based on a
later confirmation of this finding, Haier introduced the neural
efficiency hypothesis that claims that brighter individuals
show more efficient brain functioning than less intelligent
individuals (Haier, Siegel, Tang, Abel, & Buchsbaum, 1992). In
contrast to structural correlates of intelligence, evidence for
functional correlates of intelligence is contradictory. Neubauer
and Fink (2009) provided a thorough review of the pertinent
research showing that out of a total of 54 studies (employing
diverse methods of functional brain imaging like fMRI, PET,
EEG and a variety of cognitive tasks) the majority (k = 29)
confirmed theneural efficiency hypothesis (i.e. showednegative
correlations between brain activation and intelligence).
However, as shown by Neubauer and Fink (2009), another
group of studies (k = 16) produced mixed evidence, i.e. found
the expected inverse brain activation–intelligence relationship
onlywhenmoderating variableswere considered,while another
smaller group of studies (k = 9) disconfirmed the hypothesis
by finding positive relationships between intelligence and brain
activation. Thus, there is evidence pro and contrary the neural
efficiency hypothesis. Moderator variables like task complexity
(Doppelmayr et al., 2005), level of expertise in the task (state oflearning) (Grabner, Neubauer, & Stern, 2006), sex (Dunst,
Benedek, Bergner, Athenstaedt, & Neubauer, 2013; Neubauer,
Fink, & Schrausser, 2002; Neubauer, Grabner, Fink, & Neuper,
2005), and brain area (Jaušovec & Jaušovec, 2004) were
proposed to explain the conflicting evidence.
One of themost prominent variables moderating the neural
efficiency effect is task difficulty. Doppelmayr et al. (2005)
confirmed theexpected inverse IQ–brain activation relationship
for easy tasks, whereas a tendency in the opposite directionwas
observed for the more difficult items. Such an interaction
between task difficulty and intelligence was also found by Lipp
et al. (2012) and Preusse, Van der Meer, Deshpande, Krueger,
and Wartenburger (2011). With increasing task difficulty
stronger activation for participants with high intelligence was
found. This interaction was located in an occipital-temporal
region (Preusse et al., 2011) and in right frontal and right
inferior parietal regions (Lipp et al., 2012). Similar results
were found by Rypma, Berger, and D'Esposito (2002). While
high-performing participants showed activation increases
with increasing difficulty in the lateral PFC, low-performing
participants showed higher activation but minimal difficulty-
dependent increase. These findings suggest that cortical
activation is modulated by effort requirements. A common
explanation for this phenomenon is that brighter individuals
are prepared to invest more effort when working on difficult
items than individuals with lower ability. This might be due to
the circumstance that individuals with lower ability anticipate
their task-related disability and in consequence invest less
effort to solve the task. Larson, Haier, Lacasse, andHazen (1995)
were the first to test whether the perceived level of task
difficulty is responsible for individual differences in brain
activation. In a PET study, participants' task was to solve
Backwards Digit Span tasks that were tailored to the
participants' ability level in order to eliminate group differences
in effort requirements. Results demonstrated that brighter
individuals increased their metabolic rates during the difficult
task whereas less intelligent individuals decreased their
metabolic rates.
Taken together, there is no unequivocal evidence that
higher intelligence is generally related to lower brain activation
as assumed by the neural efficiency hypothesis. Prior evidence
supports the notion that task difficulty moderates the relation
between intelligence and brain activation. In line with that
research, we tested whether neural efficiency is due to
differences in intelligence per se, or rather due to differences
in task demands such as person-specific task difficulty. In other
words the question is: Does neural efficiency hold true when
people work on tasks with the same person-specific task
difficulty?
Task difficulty is known to be related to response time as
well as effort investment, two aspects that may also account
for differences in brain activation. Based on Brehm's theory
(Brehm & Self, 1989) effort expenditure directly depends
on task difficulty and motivation. The more difficult the
task, the more effort people invest in the task. However,
effort investment is only beneficial up to a certain point (of
moderate intensity of motivation), above that point perfor-
mance should again decline (following Yerkes & Dodsons's
inverted U-shaped function; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908).
Neurocognitive research on individual effort showed that
increased mental effort is frequently associated with increased
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2000).1.1. Aim of this study
In studies confirming the neural efficiency hypothesis,
typically all participants completed the same cognitive tasks.
In light of individual differences regarding intelligence, the
same task is easier for individuals with higher cognitive ability,
whereas it is more difficult for less intelligent individuals. In
other words, although all individuals work on tasks with the
same sample-based difficulty, the person-specific level of task
difficulty differs depending on the individual's level of
intellectual ability. Since the person-specific level of task
difficulty can be expected to be associated with the time and
effort spent on the cognitive task, it could also be responsible
for observed differences in brain activation.
The current study aims at testing whether the person-
specific level of task difficulty accounts for individual
differences in neural efficiency. Therefore, brain activation is
investigated using tasks with a relatively easy difficulty level
versus tasks with a relatively difficult level of task difficulty.
Consequently, in the present study a person-specific rather
than a sample-based approach was used for assigning the
task difficulty. According to the person-specific approach the
task difficulty is defined relative to an individual's intellectual
ability. Using this approach ensures that the perceived level
of task difficulty is the same for individuals with varying
intellectual ability. As a consequence, brighter individuals
compared to less intelligent ones have to work on tasks
which are actually more difficult (i.e., with respect to sample-
based task difficulty). Additionally, tasks and participants were
selected in a way that the easy items for more intelligent
individuals were the same items as the difficult items for less
intelligent individuals. Consequently, the typical comparison
between brighter and less bright individuals working on the
same tasks was still possible (sample-based approach).
The task employed in the current study is the number
series completion task which is used to assess numerical
inductive reasoning. The number series used in this study
consists of automatically generated, Rasch-calibrated items
which provide the opportunity to estimate the task difficulty
relative to different levels of intelligence (Rasch, 1980).
Themain aim of the studywas to refine the neural efficiency
hypothesis. The crucial research question was whether neural
efficiency is not only a function of differences in intelligence but
also a function of task demands such as person-specific task
difficulty. Neural efficiency during number processing was
investigated under two experimental conditions working on
sample-based same difficult items or working on person-
specific same difficult items.We expected to find no differences
in brain activation between intelligence groups working on
tasks with same person-specific task difficulty. When working
on tasks with same person-specific task difficulty, we expect
that brighter individuals show lower brain activation compared
to less intelligent individuals, thus the result would be in
line with the neural efficiency hypotheses. Then we would
conclude that neural efficiency reflects a kind of adaption to
requirements of the corresponding tasks, which depends on
both, intelligence and sample-based task difficulty.2. Method
2.1. Participants
Out of a pool of 298 participants who completed an
intelligence structure test, 60 people (32 women and 28men,
aged between 18 and 50 years) were selected for this study.
Participants were selected on their g-factor score and
represented individualswith relatively low average intelligence
(IQ range 80–100) or relatively high average to superior
intelligence (IQ range 110–130). Two people were excluded
from the analysis because of movement artifacts and technical
acquisition problems. The final sample thus comprised 58
persons, who were divided into lower (n = 28) and higher
(n = 30) intelligence groups on the basis of their g-factor
scores. The lower intelligence group had an average IQ of 93
(SD = 5.59) whereas the higher intelligence group had an
average IQ of 123 (SD = 9.25). Thus, the two extreme groups
differed significantly in terms of psychometric g (t(56) =
−14.96, p b .01; d = 2.04). All participants gave written
informed consent approved by the local ethics committee and
received €15 for their participation in the fMRI test session.2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Intelligence screening
Participants' general intelligence was assessed by means
of the intelligence-structure-battery (INSBAT; Arendasy,
Hornke, et al., 2008). The intelligence structure battery is a
computerized adaptive intelligence test battery based on the
Cattell–Horn–Carroll model (cf. McGrew, 2009), which is
commonly used in German-speaking countries. In addition to
psychometric g, the test battery assesses fluid intelligence (Gf),
crystallized intelligence (Gc), quantitative knowledge (Gq),
visual processing (Gv), short-term memory (Gstm) and
long-term memory (Gltm). Each of these second-order stratum
factors can be measured by means of two or more subtests
constructed by means of different approaches to automatic
item generation (for an overview: Arendasy & Sommer, 2012a,
2013; Irvine & Kyllonen, 2002). All subtests were calibrated by
means of the 1PL Rasch model and exhibited good construct
and criterion validities (for an overview: Arendasy, Hornke, et
al., 2008). In order to obtain a screening measure of
psychometric g the following four subtests were completed:
figural-inductive reasoning (FID), arithmetic flexibility (NF),
verbal short-term memory (VEK) and word meaning (WB).
The subtests were selected to cover a broad range of stratum
two factors to avoid construct-underrepresentation in
estimating psychometric g (cf. Major, Johnson, & Bouchard,
2011). Furthermore, using a more comprehensive estimate of
psychometric g that does not include the experimental task
itself also bypasses possible problems of retest effects that have
been observed for fluid intelligence test (e.g., Arendasy &
Sommer, 2013). All subtests were presented as computerized
adaptive tests (CAT) with a target reliability corresponding to
α = .70. Factor loadings obtained with a representative
Austrian norm sample were used to estimate the g-factor
score based on the subtest results. The factor scores were
further converted into IQ scores using the Austrian norm
sample.
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In the fMRI scanner, participants completed number series
tasks taken from the subtest numerical-inductive reasoning
(NID: Arendasy & Sommer, 2012a) of the intelligence structure
battery (INSBAT: Arendasy, Hornke, et al., 2008). The task of
the participants was to discover the rules, which govern the
number series item and to complete the number series by
selecting the number, that completes the series (e.g., 4 8 16 32
64 128 ? correct response: 256). The total item pool of this
computerized adaptive test comprised 120 number series, which
had been calibrated by means of the 1PL Rasch model (Rasch,
1980). Previous studies already demonstrated that these items
measure fluid intelligence and exhibit a g-factor saturation
comparable to commonly used figural matrices tests (e.g.,
Arendasy, Hergovich, et al., 2008; Arendasy & Sommer, 2012b).
Furthermore, item design features linked to cognitive compo-
nent processes involved in solving number series accounted for
88% of the differences in the 1PL item parameters. Thus, there is
evidence on the construct validity of the number series used in
the present study. In the present study a subset of items was
taken from the entire item pool. We chose 10 easy items (e.g.,
25 28 27 30 29 32 ? correct response: 31; 1PL item difficulty
parameter: mean σ = −1.22; SD = 0.38), 10 medium hard
items (e.g., 16 10 15 30 24 29 ? correct response: 58; 1PL item
difficulty parameter: mean σ =0.18, SD = 0.12) and 10
difficult items (e.g., 32 34 16 38 8 42 ? correct response: 4;
1PL item difficulty parameter: mean σ =1.57, SD = 0.44).
The easy and medium hard items were selected so that the
lower intelligence group would have a mean person-specific
solution probability of .80 and .50, respectively. The medium
and hard items were selected to ensure that the higher
intelligent participants would have mean person-specific
solution probabilities of .80 and .50, respectively. The
mean solution probabilities were calculated by estimating
participants' NID person parameter on the basis of the
g-factor scores using the g-factor loadings of each of the five
INSBAT subtests used in the present study.
A control condition was implemented by using 10 number
series filled with zeros (e.g., 0 0 0 0 0 0). The zeros were
replaced with a number between one and five within 15 until
25 s (e.g., 2 2 2 2 2 2). Participants were asked to respond as
quickly as possible and indicate by button press which
number was presented.Table 1
Design of the study (cells list expected solution probabilities for the NID task
performed during fMRI scanning).
Solution rate
Easy Medium Hard
Intelligence group Lower IQ 80% 50%
Higher IQ 80% 50%2.2.3. Experimental design
Participants completed a total of 20 number series tasks
in the fMRI scanner. While higher intelligent participants
worked on number series ofmedium and high difficulty, lower
intelligent participants completed easy and medium difficult
number series. In this manner all participants completed
number series with expected mean person specific solution
probability of .80 and .50, respectively. Thus, a 2 × 2 design
with the between-subject factor IQ GROUP and the within-
subject factor person-specific TASK DIFFICULTY could be used
to evaluate, whether differences in task performance and brain
activation between lower and higher intelligent participants
are attributable to group differences in person-specific solution
probabilities. In addition, we were able to compare the task
performance and brain activation of lower and higher
intelligent participants when working on identical item set,since both groups worked on items of medium difficulty
(i.e. same sample-based task difficulty; cf. Table 1).
2.2.4. fMRI acquisition
A 3.0 T Siemens Magnetom Skyra syngo Scanner (Siemens
Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) with a 32 channel head
coil was used. To minimize head movements, subjects' heads
were stabilized with foam cushions. Functional images were
obtained in 36 slices, in an inter-leaved order. T2*-weighted
functional images were obtained with a single shot gradient
echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence sensitive to blood
oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (repetition time
[TR] 3000 ms, echo time [TE] 30 ms, voxel size 3.5 × 3.5 ×
3.5 mm, matrix size 64 × 64, field of view: 192, flip angle [FA]
90°).
Stimulus presentation was accomplished with an LCD
projector, visible for the participant through a mirror
mounted above the head coil. The paradigm was presented
with the software package Presentation (Neurobehavioral
Systems, Albany, CA). In Fig. 1a, schematic display of one trial
is depicted. The presentation of the fixation cross (10–20 s)
marked the beginning of each trial. After this, the stimulus
presentation started (max. 60 s) and the participants had to
respond as fast and accurately as possible. If participants
knew the correct solution within 60 s, they could respond by
key press, effecting that the number series was replaced by
five response options. Otherwise the five response options
appeared after 60 s. Four numeric response options and
the response “none is correct” (to reduce guessing) were
presented. For responding, a response box was placed in the
participants' right hand. A randomly selected response was
highlighted in the beginning. Participants could then move
left or right between response options using the left or right
button. To confirm the selected response the middle button
had to be pressed. Each response was followed by a randomly
jittered inter-trial interval of 10–20 s.
2.2.5. fMRI-analyses
Functional MRI scans were analyzed using the Software
SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
London, UK). For each person preprocessing was performed,
including motion correction, slice acquisition time correction
and spatial normalization into the standard MNI space
(Montreal Neurological Institute). Finally, the data were
smoothed in the spatial domain using a Gaussian kernel of
10.5 mm FWHM. Due to the self-paced design, the length
of the fMRI sequence varied. On average 472 volumes (SD =
98) were acquired. A general linear model (GLM) was
estimated for each participant, using the conditions ‘FIXATION’
(i.e., inter-trial fixation period), ‘CONTROL’ (i.e., control trials
requiring no reasoning), ‘EASY’ (person-specific easy number
series items; A vs. B), and ‘DIFFICULT’ (person-specific difficult
Fig. 1. Schematic time course for the number series task. After an inter-trial interval (10–20 s), participants worked on the number series task in a self-paced
manner (timeout 60 s). When participants knew the solution they had to press a key and then could select one of the presented numbers. n.c. = no response
option correct.
Table 2
Solution rates and response times in the number series task for higher and
lower intelligent individuals.
Solution rate (%) Response time (s)
Easy Medium Hard Easy Medium Hard
Intelligence
group
Lower
IQ
61.79 47.86 24.15 31.45
Higher
IQ
68.33 45 25.72 31.48
26 B. Dunst et al. / Intelligence 42 (2014) 22–30number series items; B vs. C). For person-specific easy and
difficult trials, a constant period representing the first 15 s of
each trial wasmodeled in order to control for activation effects
due to variation in response times within and between
participants (82% of trials had a response time of 15 s or
more, shorter trials were excluded from the analysis). The
remaining task timewasmodeled by a separate regressor of no
interest. Finally, motion parameters were included in the
model to account for uncorrected motion effects.
For the analysis of task-related activation, a factorial design
was implemented. Task-related activation was defined by the
contrast EASY and DIFFICULT vs. CONTROL. The analysis for the
entire group was performed by computing linear t-contrasts
for each subject individually which were then entered into the
second level analysis, employing a significance level of p b .05
(corrected for family wise error [FWE]). Potential intelligence
effects on brain activation when working on person-specific
easy, person-specific difficult and sample-based equally
difficult tasks were analyzed with three two-sample t-tests
using IQ GROUP as between subjects factor. Linear t-contrasts
(EASY vs. CONTROL, and DIFFICULT vs. CONTROL) were
computed for each subject individually which were then
entered into the second level analysis. Results are only
presented if they were significant on cluster level (p b .001,
uncorrected) and exceeded a minimum cluster size of 50 for
intelligence differences. The clusters showing significant
intelligence group differences were used for the construction
of functionally defined ROIs. We then computed contrast
estimates within ROIs to determine the magnitude and
direction of significant effects.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral results
In order to examine possible group differences between
more and less intelligent individuals with respect to task
performance (solution rate and response time) when
completing person-specific easy and difficult number series,
a two-way ANOVA with IQ GROUP (lower vs. higher) as
between-subjects variable and TASK DIFFICULTY (person-
specific easy vs. person-specific difficult) as within-subjects
variable was computed. For the analysis of solution rates, the
main effect IQ GROUP remained insignificant (F(1,56) =
0.13, p = .72). As shown in Table 2, a significant main effect
TASK DIFFICULTY was observed (F(1,56) = 29.38, p = .00;
partial η2 = .34). Participants solved more person-specific
easy number series correct than person-specific difficult
number series. The two-way interaction IQ GROUP ∗ TASK
DIFFICULTY was also non-significant (F(1,56) = 1.87, p =
.18).For the analysis of response times (for correct trials),
neither a significant main effect IQ GROUP (F(1,56) = 0.14,
p = .71) nor a significant two-way interaction IQ GROUP ∗
TASK DIFFICULTY (F(1,56) = 0.41, p = .53) was found. This
implies that, although a self-paced design was employed,
intelligence groups did not differ in the average time-on-task,
which is most likely due to the adaption of task-difficulty to
the ability level. The main effect TASK DIFFICULTY was
significant, indicating that it took longer to solve difficult
number series than easy number series (F(1,56) = 29.49,
p = .00, partial η2 = .35; Table 2). We then analyzed possible
group differences betweenmore and less intelligent individuals
with respect to task performance during performing equally
difficult number series. As expected, higher intelligent
individuals showed a higher solution rate (t(56) = −3.35,
p b .01, d = 0.90) and lower response times (t(56) = 2.37,
p = .02, d = 0.63) than lower intelligent individuals when
working on identical tasks. To sum up, intelligence group
differences in task performance were only found for the subset
of tasks showing the same sample-based difficulty, but not
when comparing tasks of similar person-specific difficulty.3.2. Task-related brain activation
The contrast EASY and DIFFICULT N CONTROL revealed
eight significant clusters (see Table 3). Performance of the
number series task was related to brain activation in the left
inferior and bilateral regions of the middle frontal gyrus.
Activation in the parietal cortex emerged in the superior
parietal lobule, bilaterally. Finally, significant activation
clusters were found in the cerebellum in the left hemisphere
and in the inferior occipital lobule in the right hemisphere.
The reverse contrast (CONTROL N EASY and DIFFICULT)
returned nine significant clusters in the right frontal, bilateral
temporal and parietal cortex (for more detail see Table 3),
indicating that these brain regions were more strongly
activated in the control task as compared to the reasoning
task. Brain areas active during number series task are depicted
in Fig. 2. The same clusters were significant when only tasks
Fig. 2. Brain areas activated during number series task (EASY and DIFFICULT vs. CONTROL). The activation period was the first 15 s after the stimulus appeared.
Red means relative higher activation during the number series compared to the control task and blue means relative lower activation during the number series
compared to the control task. The figure presents 5 axial slices in neurological convention from z = 10 to 50, MNI space.
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analysis.Table 3
Whole brain analysis of brain areas activated during number series tasks.3.3. Intelligence effects on tasks with the same person-speciﬁc
task difﬁculty
In order to examine possible group differences between the
lower and higher intelligence groups with respect to brain
activation when working on tasks with the same person-
specific task difficulty, two t-contrasts with IQ GROUP as
between-subjects variable were computed, for person-specific
easy and difficult items, respectively.
No significant intelligence group differences emerged —
neither for easy nor for difficult tasks. This implies that the two
intelligence groups did not differ in their brain activationwhen
compared at a person-specific equal level of task difficulty.Brain area MNI peak
coordinate
x y z k T pcorr
EASY and DIFFICULT N CONTROL
Inferior frontal L (BA 46) −50 25 27 242 6.73 .00
Parietal L −29 −49 31 36 6.71 .00
Inferior occipital R (BA 18) 31 −98 −5 11 6.12 .00
Superior parietal L (BA 7) −22 −81 52 45 5.88 .00
Superior parietal R (BA 7) 20 −70 62 27 5.73 .00
Middle frontal L (BA 6) −29 11 62 29 5.67 .00
Middle frontal R (BA 6) 34 11 62 6 5.34 .01
Cerebellum L −1 −81 −26 6 5.33 .01
CONTROL N EASY and DIFFICULT
Precuneus L (BA 31) −5 −60 27 3290 12.11 .00
Inferior parietal lobe R
(BA 40)
66 −28 24 1352 10.27 .00
Angular L (BA 40) −54 −60 24 1076 10.19 .00
Temporal middle L (BA 21) −64 −14 −22 420 9.07 .00
Medial frontal R (BA 10) 3 56 −5 763 9.00 .00
Inferior orbital frontal R
(BA 38)
31 25 −26 6 5.49 .01
Superior medial frontal R
(BA 6)
13 32 62 4 5.38 .01
Thalamus L −12 −25 −1 14 5.37 .01
Superior temporal R (BA 38) 34 21 −33 3 5.3 .01
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, BA = Brodmann area.3.4. Intelligence effects on tasks with the same sample-based
task difﬁculty
We then analyzed intelligence group effects on brain
activation during reasoning tasks with the same sample-
based task difficulty on brain activation of less intelligent
versus brighter individuals. The T-contrast revealed that the
right insula is more strongly activated in the lower intelligence
group as compared to the higher intelligence group when
working on tasks with same sample-based difficulty. In the
reverse contrast (higher N lower intelligence) no significant
activation cluster were observed. In a second step, individual
contrast estimates were computed for the ROI defined by the
significant group. The contrast estimates showed that working
on the number series compared to the control task resulted in
lower relative activation of the right insula in both intelligence
groups, but this relative deactivation was significantly stronger
in the higher intelligence group (t[56] = 3.20, p ≤ .01; see
Fig. 3).
Moreover, we analyzed intelligence group differences
separately for males and females in a SPM whole brain
analyses, showing no significant effect by sex.4. Discussion
This study aimed at further examining the effect of person-
specific and sample-based differences in task difficulty on the
phenomenon of neural efficiency. Our hypothesiswas based on
research demonstrating that neural efficiency was often
observed for easy to moderately difficult tasks but not for
hard tasks (Neubauer & Fink, 2009). More specifically, it was
tested whether these findings might be attributed to the task
demands such as person-specific task difficulty.
Behaviorally, as expected individuals working on tasks
with the same person-specific task difficulty performed
equally well in the number series task, whereas a classical
comparison between brighter and less intelligent individuals
Fig. 3. (A) T-contrast between intelligence groups when working on tasks with same sample-based task difficulty with a significant cluster in the right insula.
(B) Mean contrast estimates of number series task (against control) for higher and lower intelligent individuals when working on tasks with the same
sample-based difficulty.
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resulted in lower task performance of less intelligent individuals
compared to brighter ones. Furthermore, individual differences
in brain activation were only found when working on a task of
the same sample-based task difficulty only but not when task
difficulty was adapted to the ability of the participants. When
confronted with the same sample-based difficulty brighter
individuals showed lower activation in the insula than less
intelligent individuals. This suggests that neural efficiency
reflects some kind of compensatory effort, presumably due to
the fact that less bright individuals perceive the same tasks as
more difficult. These findings shall now be discussed in more
detail.
4.1. Behavioral results
Intelligence group differences in task performance
were only found for tasks showing the same sample-based
task difficulty, but not when using tasks tailored to the
individuals' ability. These results reflect the general finding
that less intelligent individuals require more time to solve
tasks and make more mistakes when working on tasks with
the same sample-based task difficulty (e.g., Neubauer, Grabner,
Freudenthaler, Beckmann, & Guthke, 2004; Neubauer, Riemann,
Mayer, & Angleitner, 1997; Neubauer et al., 2002). However,
when comparing performance while working on tasks with the
same person-specific level of task difficulty brighter individuals
and less intelligent individuals did not differ in their solution rates
and reaction times neitherwhenworking on person-specific easy
nor when working on person-specific difficult tasks. This result
replicates previous findings reported by Larson et al. (1995). As in
our study, Larson and colleges used items that were tailored to
the participants' own ability levels, thereby standardizing task
difficulty.
Thus, it can be assumed that the task demands were
the same for IQ groups in the same person-specific task
difficulty condition. However, task demands were lower for
brighter individuals when working on tasks with the same
sample-based task difficulty. These results indicate that
the operationalization of the experimental task difficulty
conditions was successful.5. fMRI results
As we were specifically interested in whether intelligence
differences in neural efficiency can be traced back to the
relative task difficulty depending on the individual level of
intellectual ability, it is of particular interest to highlight our
results on how intelligence groups differ in brain activation
when working on tasks with comparable person-specific and
sample-based difficulty. When working on person-specific
same difficult tasks brighter and less intelligent individuals
did not show any activation differences. As we designed the
experiment to ensure that task demands were equivalent for
the two groups, it can be assumed that invested mental effort
(quantified by brain activity) is the same for lower versus
higher intelligent individuals when working on tasks showing
the same person-specific difficulty.
Intelligence-dependent activation differences supporting
neural efficiency were only observed when participants
worked on tasks with the same sample-based task difficulty.
Specifically, analyses indicated that brighter individuals showed
lower relative activity in the right insula than less intelligent
individuals.
The insula, together with a fronto-parietal network has
been repeatedly related to intelligence (cf. Jung & Haier,
2007). These are brain regions that are assumed to constitute
an important network involved in complex information
processing. The insula is involved in high-level cognitive control
and attentional processes (Menon & Uddin, 2010), such as
engaging task-relevant cognitive processes while disengaging
task-irrelevant systems (Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008).
The insula is also involved in the bottom-up detection of salient
events, the switching between large-scale networks (default-
mode network and central-executive network), autonomic
reactivity to salient stimuli and the access to the motor system
(Menon & Uddin, 2010). The insula as part of the salience
network is important for monitoring the salience of external
inputs and internal brain events. If relevant stimuli from the
vast and continuous stream of sensory stimuli are identified,
then the insula is thought to dynamically switch between
default-mode network and central-executive network (Bressler
&Menon, 2010). The right insula plays a crucial role in activating
29B. Dunst et al. / Intelligence 42 (2014) 22–30the central-executive network (mediating attentional, working
memory and higher order cognitive processes) and deactivating
the default-mode network (Sridharan et al., 2008).
How could the insula finding be related to intelligence and
efficiency? It can be assumed that the employed reasoning task
strongly taxes the central-executive network for identifying
and testing rules underlying the number series, but does not
require much sensory salience detection. This is quite different
for the control task, which required reacting as quickly as
possible to a change of the stimulus. Accordingly, a stronger
involvement of the insula (as part of the salience network) in
the control task as compared to the reasoning task could be
considered as an efficient adaptation of brain activity. This
adaptive response is exactly what was found for higher
intelligent individuals but only to a significant lower degree
in lower intelligent individuals due to a higher person-specific
challenge. It hence could be concluded that higher intelligent
brains aremore efficient in terms ofmore selectively activating
task-relevant brain regions (Lipp et al., 2012). This inter-
pretation is in line with recent findings suggesting that
intelligence is related to stronger brain activation in task-
positive networks and lower brain activation in task-negative
networks (Basten, Stelzel, & Fiebach, 2013). Finally, the
findings add to the evidence that complex reasoning can be
understood in terms of adaptive activation of large-scale brain
networks (cf., Bressler & Menon, 2010). In this context, the
results may help caution that subject IQ can affect brain
activation, and that IQ hence can be an important factor to
consider in cognitive neuroscience research.
Interestingly, our findings are not in line with previous
findings by Larson et al. (1995) who found increased
activation in brighter individuals and decreased activation
in average-intelligent individuals when working on person-
specific hard tasks. The discrepant findings could in part be
the result of the different imaging methods. While Larson
et al. (1995) used PET, this study used an event-related
approach with fMRI. Furthermore, the task used by Larson
was a backwards digit span task commonly used to assess
working memory whereas number series were used in the
current study. The different demands underlying backwards
digit span tasks and number series could also be a possible
explanation for the conflicting results. Finally, the Larson
study used somewhat easier item-difficulty levels (Larson et al.:
90% and 75%; this study: 80% and 50%) thus examining brain
activation related to a lower degree of cognitive challenge.
As a potential limitation of this study, it should be noted
that significant group differences were obtained with a rather
liberal threshold criterion (p b .001 uncorrected double
thresholded with a minimum cluster size of 50 voxel), but
would not be significant when applying a conservative
threshold such as FWE correction. In part a more sensitive
criterion could be justified by the fact that individual differences'
analyses usually have lower power than within-subject task
contrasts.
6. Conclusion
The results provide evidence that neural efficiency is a
function of both intelligence and task demands. Results
indicate that the neural efficiency hypothesis needs to be
refined. According to the refined definition, neural efficiencydescribes the phenomenon that more intelligent individuals
show lower brain activity than less intelligent ones only
when working on cognitive tasks with a comparable sample-
based difficulty. We hypothesize that this reflects a more
efficient adaption of brain activation due to lower person-
specific challenge. However, when comparable person-
specific challenge is established lower versus higher IQ
brains show similar brain activity levels. These results
suggest that the neural efficiency phenomenon may actually
be explained by the adaption of brain activation to the
person-specific task demands.Acknowledgments
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